

Brazil's Status Struggles: Why Good Guys Finish Last

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Introduction

Recent domestic crises have put something of a dampener on Brazil's great power aspirations. Indeed, its quest for international recognition has recently taken a backseat as Brazil seeks to get its domestic house in order (Marcondes and Mawdsley, 2017). The heyday of Lula's globe-trotting presidency, which promoted a confident, outward facing Brazil, seems a long-distant memory. Now mired in economic and constitutional crisis, a malaise has fallen over Brazilian politics that has led to a shrunken foreign policy agenda, characterized by inertia rather than dynamism (Burgess and Chagas Bastos, 2017). Few speak about the "rise of Brazil anymore", at least not without bitter irony.¹ Yet, gloom about the present can often prompt unreflexive nostalgia for the past.²

We suggest that this period of pessimism is an apt moment to take long-lens perspective on Brazil's historical quest for status. To be sure, the "rise of Brazil narrative" was certainly ubiquitous, but the extent to which it was matched by international recognition is currently unknown. Indeed, existing research on Brazil's fervent status-seeking has tended highlight its efforts to seek status with little attempt to assess its success in gaining recognition (e.g. S. F. Christensen, 2013, p. 284; Stolte, 2015). Indeed, beyond the high bar of gaining membership of the Security Council, these studies lack an ability to assess the success of these policies. Therefore, to complement existing research into Brazil's status seeking, and contextualize the other chapters in this volume, we provide a systematic evaluation and analysis of Brazil's status performance between 1970 and 2010. To what extent was Brazil able to translate its economic resources into international status across the period.? Compared to its BRICS peers, did Brazil's status-seeking bring about relative improvement in international recognition?

This is a difficult question. As Benjamin de Carvalho's discussion of status in chapter two alludes, getting a handle on international status is no easy task. Indeed, status is a social-relational phenomenon, it requires recognition from other actors to become realized (Wohlforth et al., 2017). As such, it cannot be read off the material capabilities of a state: From Byzantine to France during WWII, the historical record is littered with actors enjoying status apparently disconnected from their material means (De Carvalho & Neumann, 2015).

¹ The economist was particularly fond of talking up Brazil in this manner cite cite

² On the perils of "Retrotopian" nostalgia see Beaumont (2018)

In other words, a country might very well be great in size, resources and have the desire for great power status, but these do not automatically grant it recognition for great power status: international status dynamics do not operate fairly nor predictably. Nonetheless, it is these opaque, but significant practices of gaining and maintaining recognition from others that we seek to shed light on here.

To this end, we put to work a recently developed framework for systematically assessing and comparing countries status performance across time (Røren and Beaumont, forthcoming forthcoming) This approach explicitly builds upon decades of large N “status discrepancy” research to create a mixed-methods framework that can zoom in on and compare individual state’s relative status performance (Galtung, 1964; Renshon, 2016, 2017; Volgy et al., 2011) In short, and as we will elaborate below, using the relative level of diplomatic representation as a proxy for status recognition and relating it to its relative level of “status resources” (wealth) our procedure indicates what we conceptualize as a country’s *status performance*: how well or badly a state has managed to make the most of its material means and generate social recognition from its peers. As such this chapter makes both an empirical and theoretical contribution to IR research. First, by offering a way of evaluating the results of Brazil’s alleged status seeking across time, we fill a lacuna in the Brazil status seeking literature. Second, we suggest that by comparing Brazil’s status performance to the other BRICS can provides a useful litmus test for the common liberal claim that since the 1990s international society has begun to recognise more pro-social activities as worthy of status (Duque, 2018) Indeed, assessing how Brazil – a non-nuclear, non-interventionist, human rights advocating “peaceful power”— compares in terms of status performance to other more militaristic rising powers offers an interesting test of international societies’ alleged new liberal bonafides.

Our results will be chastening to Brazilians but not entirely surprising, after all, frustrations with Brazil’s position in the world have long abounded, even before the recent crises. In short, our findings suggest that only does Brazil underperform compared to its status resources, but that it performs worse than any of its BRICS peers. While Brazilian politicians have tended to blame the P5 for excluding them from the high status “in group”, our findings show that Brazil has also struggled with recognition from smaller powers for a prolonged period stretching from the 1970s into the 21st century. However, our findings do suggest that Lula’s foreign policy was beginning to pay dividends: Brazil enjoyed its biggest improvement in status performance during the period 2005-2010. The rest of this chapter will first elaborate our theoretical framework and methodology, before combining our large N data with case

study analysis to proffer plausible but we emphasize, preliminary, explanations for this performance.

Status Performance Framework

How can we measure and evaluate the level of recognition the BRICS have received for their status-seeking efforts? Here we build upon quantitative large N studies that have developed the ‘status discrepancy’ methodology. This approach has largely used it to construct a categorical independent variable and focused on testing its relationship to various war-related events (e.g. Renshon, 2016) Yet with some conceptual tweaking, Røren and Beaumont (forthcoming) show how this methodology can also provide systemic level empirics that illuminate individual states’ relative status performance, which in turn can be used as a starting point for a qualitative assessment of the countries’ status performance. In short, we conceptualize *status performance* as a function of a state’s relative *status resources* (material capabilities) translated through socially embedded practices into changing levels of relative *status recognition*. The following section elaborates upon the theoretical and methodological choices underwriting this procedure.

First, in order to capture *status recognition*, we look to diplomatic recognition, and specifically the type and amount of diplomatic representation a country hosts within its borders. The significant decision to establish an embassy in another country, coupled with the mundane practice of maintaining it there, is essentially a vote for the receiving country’s importance in the world. Regardless of what a state may value as important in their relations with another state, establishing diplomatic ties is likely to serve as a useful tool to facilitate it (Neumayer, 2008: 228). While diplomatic missions offer undoubted utility, states send only around one in five of the embassies they could send (Duque, 2018). Therefore, embassies perform a ‘symbolic role as a concrete representation of the importance attached to a bilateral relationship.’ (Malone, 2013: 124) Critically, diplomatic representation reflects what the agents *themselves* considered sufficiently important to maintain diplomatic missions in a given country; it is precisely because states select according to their own subjective criteria that diplomatic missions are said to fulfil the inter-subjective and relational aspects required to fit with status theory. Similar to how the invisible hand of the market works through the allocation of money to determine value in a market, the allocation of scarce diplomatic resources provides a window into how status is allocated in the international system. Indeed, Marina Duque suggests

diplomacy is ‘par excellence the locus of status in international politics’ and the practice of establishing diplomatic representation ‘the best indicator of (status) recognition’ available to researchers (Duque, 2018: 10; also see Kinne, 2014; Renshon, 2016).

One way of operationalizing diplomatic representation is to count and rank how many diplomats or embassies each country has within its territories, while taking into account that not all embassies should be weighted equally. In other words, having an embassy from the US indicates higher status than having a Finnish embassy located in the country. In order to take this into account, we utilize Renshon’s ingenious approach of using Google’s PageRank algorithm to sort the diplomatic rank of the world’s countries. In addition to the overall number of embassies a country ‘receives’ (size), the algorithm specifies that countries will benefit more from being connected to those countries with higher recognition than countries with lower recognition (quality), as well as from those countries with few embassies established abroad (exclusivity). The result of the numerous iterations is converted into an ordinal rank to conform with the positional definition of status. While this procedure is currently the best means of assessing long-term systemic patterns of status recognition, it has limitations that mean it should be regarded as a good but imperfect window into international status dynamics (Miller et al., 2015: 51).

The second component of our status performance framework is what we call *Status resources*. These are understood as a state’s cumulative potential for social action that could generate status recognition for a state. Crucially, status resources are not understood as timeless status attributes equated directly with status, (as in Volgy et al., 2011) but as a resource that indicates *potential* for actions with status effects. In short, we assume the more *economic* resources a state has the more actions a state and its people can undertake that could affect the state’s status recognition. We do not presume the more economic resources the better the status recognition, only the more potential. Certainly, we are guilty of reifying the idea that wealth enables action, but we are not reifying the idea that wealth equals status. Thus, by conceiving of material attributes as status resources that can only generate recognition through social action, we seek to capture the relationship between material capabilities and status, without being locked in to it. While it is common in status discrepancy research to utilize some measure of military capacities as a marker of ‘objective status’. In contrast our conception of status seeks to illuminate the *agency* of actors in making the most of their *potential* (resources) to *seek* status, total wealth is a superior theoretical fit because it is more fungible than military power. Military power is a function of wealth and not the other way

around. In short, states can *choose* to spend wealth on their military, on embassies abroad, on aid, on social welfare, or on something else, and each could contribute to earning status recognition. Spending economic resources on military power may well offer the best status seeking *strategy*, but given that it involves agency, choice and thus skill, it should be investigated in the qualitative analysis. Ultimately, this is why GNI is chosen as our sole measure of status resource rather than military capacity, or indeed any other potential status resource.³

Ultimately this generates what we call *status performance*: the combined measure of diplomatic representation on the one hand and status resources and status generating actions on the other. Status performance seeks to capture *how well* a state utilizes its potential status resources and *how well* its status seeking has resonated with its international audiences. As suggested before, this model resembles Volgy et al.'s (2011) 'status discrepancy' and Renshon's (2017) 'status deficit' measures, yet differs conceptually and in how we cash it out in analysis.⁴ Indeed, we suggest divergent status performances constitute puzzles that that can be solved with qualitative interpretation.

Status resources provide a baseline from which to assess a countries relative performance in generating status recognition: whether they are performing well or badly given their status resources. However, to explain status performance, the analysis requires not only interpreting the actors skill in pursuing policies in a manner that leads to status recognition, but also how this recognition has been limited or enabled by contextual factors within international society. Regarding agency of states to affect their status, we conceptualize status recognition as a continuous *side effect of* domestic and foreign policy, whether sought or not. The degree to which a public action resonates with an audience may be consciously manipulated with skillful presentation, or it may be an unintended side-effect. Yet while

³ GNI gathered from the UN's National Accounts Main Aggregates Database for 2012 <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp> (accessed 02.04.2014). We use GNI rather than GDP since it is seen to be most representative of a specific country's overall breadth and strength of economy (see Wood, 1990).

⁴ First, all the countries are ranked on the basis of their PageRank score in each year. The countries are then ranked on the basis of the size of their GNI. Subsequently, the countries' rank on the PageRank measure is subtracted from their respective rank on GNI. These results in a rank discrepancy measure – the difference between countries' 'real' rank on their status resources and their status recognition. This discrepancy is then standardized using the standard deviation between the ranks and subsequently plotted in a simple diagram for each of the discrepancy models from 1970-2010. A number closer to zero on the performance of military capabilities or wealth would suggest that they receive as much recognition as their status resources would suggest was normal: par for course. Any positive or negative discrepancies would indicate that the particular country is either over performing (+) or underperforming (-) relative to their status resources.

generating status requires skill, the game is not fair. Like most markets, the international status hierarchy includes structural advantages to some actors that favor the reproduction of the status quo. Explaining status performance requires analysis of countries' practices, but also the context within which they operate. While we use the term 'structure' here, we mean to imply contextual factors beyond a state's control that may inhibit or enable its generation of status recognition. We do not mean to imply necessarily either universal or timeless effect. For instance, the NPT, and the growing norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons would count as a structural factor that *could* inhibit or *enable* status performance depending on a state's specific temporal and political relationship to the treaty. The mixed method aspect of our status performance framework aims to draw attention to *variable* status effects of a state's policies and their interplay with their unique historical context

Section 3. Brazil versus the RICS

The following section thus zooms in on the status performance of the BRICS in order to investigate to what extent these dreams of greatness were realized and how Brazil's status seeking measures up to its BRICS rivals. Indeed, the BRICS sought elevated status in international society long before Goldman Sachs gave them their ubiquitous moniker (O'Neill, 2001). Indeed, beyond the minimalistic yet fuzzy characteristics of being big and growing relatively quickly, the strongest commonality among the BRICS is their governments' explicit desire to acquire higher *social status*. Indeed, International Relations (IR) scholars have thoroughly documented the various status-strategies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (see for instance Barber and Barratt, 1990; Basrur, 2011; Clunan, 2014; Deng, 2011; Forsberg et al., 2014; Herz, 2011; Larson and Shevchenko, 2014; Leith and Pretorius, 2009; Paul and Shankar, 2014; Schweller and Pu, 2014; Stolte, 2015). The overall conclusion of these studies is uni-directional: status concerns the BRICS a great deal, and informs their foreign policy choices. Indeed, Brazil, has long seemed eager to join the ranks of the great powers, and by doing so has 'striven for symbols of international recognition, prestige and status'. (Stolte, 2015: 49) Indeed, there is no shortage of examples of Brazilian leaders stating such ambitions. In a 2001 survey among Brazilian elites, for instance, 99 percent suggested that "becoming a world leader was a fundamental objective of Brazilian foreign policy" (Herz, 2011: 170). Former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso suggested in 2012 that 'the Brazilians were all the time envisaging what we might become'. (The Economist, 2012) This was reiterated by successive leaders and ministers, including former President Lula da Silva, suggesting in 2012 that Brazil finally was 'preparing to

transform itself into one of the great nations of the world.’ (quoted in Stolte, 2015: 44) This ambitious foreign policy was driven by their frustration with the western dominated hierarchy of the G20 and the impermeability of the UN Security Council (UNSC)(Erthal Abdenur, 2014; Reid, 2014).

We analyse the results of the measure, comparing Brazil with its BRIC peers, to qualitatively infer contextualized explanations for Brazil’s relative status performance. As the last section explained, status performance captures in broad strokes how well a state has translated its status resources into status recognition over time. In this way status performance illuminates when states struggle to turn their status resources into recognition, or when they manage to enjoy high status recognition despite having less status resources: *overperformance* or *underperformance* respectively. Thus, we first briefly present our results and flesh out the main trends in our data, before, focusing on the curious aspects of the Brazil’s status performance vis-à-vis its “status peer-group”.⁵

Although the BRICS have all do not share a common time frame or trajectory for their economic growth, they have all at some point grown faster than the major Western powers. Status performance provides a means of assessing how well the BRICS translated these relative gains in material position into gains in recognition. Or, vice versa: hold onto their recognition when in periods of relative economic decline. Table 2a shows the level of status recognition, transformed into an ordinal world rank scale for each year, while table 2b displays the status performance of the BRICS countries: the standardized discrepancy between the countries’ rank on their own status resources (table 1b) and their received status recognition (table 2a). Status performance is also illustrated visually below (figure 1). Overall, except for Brazil, the status performance of the BRICS has been strong since the 1990s. The most consistent underperformer throughout the period has been Brazil. While Brazil underperformed throughout the 40-year time frame, China underperformed before its economic reforms and South Africa only under the apartheid regime. The Soviet Union here underperformed until the end of the cold war, but Russia has consistently overperformed since, at least until end of the period assessed here, 2010. India, on the other hand, has generally performed at around ‘par’ throughout the 40 years, managing to avoid “status lag” during its recent period of rapid economic growth.

⁵ The selection of the BRICS for comparison is not an arbitrary decision: the very fact that the BRICS sought to institutionalize a semi-exclusive club for themselves indicates that they consider themselves one-another’s peer group (Wohlforth et al., 2017).

To emphasize, seeking to understand the status performance Brazil is an exercise of interpretation: the quantitative data alone cannot tell us definitively what caused status recognition. Yet, by mapping the results of different states' performance can allow us to observe trends and shocks to status performance, which via comparison, and drawing on case studies, can allow us to piece together *plausible* explanations for status performance.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Making the Most of One's Hand: status-seeking skill and structural (dis)advantages

Perhaps, the biggest puzzle that emerges from the status performance of the BRICS is how Brazil has consistently been the largest underperformer since it became a democracy (See figure 1). These status struggles would appear at least somewhat puzzling given that Brazil has made a concerted effort to follow and promote the liberal-democratic norms of international society (Herz, 2011), undertaken costly peacekeeping missions (Stolte, 2015) and risen through the rankings of GNI (See table 1). Moreover, while before 1990 one might have pointed to Brazil's small military as the root of its status struggles, after 1990 Brazil increased its military spending, yet its status recognition remained mostly unchanged and even worsened. It might be tempting to strike this up to just 'status lag': the tendency for

states to be slow to change their practices of recognition. However, Brazil is the only one of the BRICS to actually experiencing a severe status lag when their relative resources rose.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

China's rapid improvement in the years leading up to 1990 and its ability to avoid 'status lag' might help shed some light on the Brazil's status-struggles. China moved from a serious status underperformance in 1970 to managing to reach 'par' in 1990 (see figure 1). Moreover, despite growing rapidly (around 10% per year) and moving up the GNI rankings during the following two decades, its status recognition kept pace, equating to a status performance in line or above its status resources (figure 1 and table 2b). How did China avoid the sort of status lag Brazil appears to suffer? First, China's unusual status performance can be partially explained by the fact that it only received formal recognition as a state from the US in 1971, gaining its seat in the UNSC shortly after. Previously, the lack of formal recognition from the US could be seen as double whammy hitting its status performance: it was stigmatized by a superpower and did not enjoy the status benefits of the UNSC. This would seem to be reflected in China's very poor status performance in 1970: China lagged far behind less economic and militarily powerful countries. Thus, while its rise seems meteoric compared to Brazil's this does not imply that Brazil had the same agency to match it. Brazil neither started from a low level of status performance nor suffered a lack of recognition from the superpowers, nor could Brazil have claimed the status advantages from joining the UNSC

Second, while China had some contextual advantages helping its generate recognition congruent with its rise, it should not be seen as automatic, but also a function of foreign policy skill negotiating and narrating its rise. China's rapprochement with the US has long been understood through a US prism that strikes it up as a grand success for Henry Kissinger's *realpolitik*. (Goh, 2005; Tucker, 2005) However, in terms of status gains, China took full

advantage of the opportunity. Even as China has risen to second in the world in terms of GNI, it has taken great care to narrate its rise as 'peaceful' (Deng, 2008: 4–5). This seems to have defused at least some of the tension associated with power transitions involving a state with China's potential. Indeed, despite being non-democratic and having a hybrid-communist economic system, since the 1980s, China has not underperformed in terms of status in the manner of the Soviet Union (see figure 1). Part of this could also be attributed to China's export led growth strategy, Balance of Payment-surplus, trillion-dollar sovereign wealth fund (Bu, 2010), and vast and growing global FDI portfolio (Cheung and Qian, 2009), which has arguably made China too economically important to let misgivings about their political system affect the willingness of states to recognize China. Indeed, this would be consistent with Neumayer's (2008) research which suggests that above a certain power threshold, ideological affinity ceases to influence patterns of status recognition. Moreover, the status performance measure may be a reflection of how developing countries consider China an appealing diplomatic partner compared to Western countries due the lack of political-economic conditionalities it attaches to its foreign investments (Woods, 2008). Ultimately, China's status recognition has kept up pace with its rapid increase in status resources *unusually* well. Indeed, China's status has not lagged, and we would suggest that this is a combination of structural advantages that have been maximized by China's foreign policy skill.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

Third, China's geographical location in region populated by large and powerful states as well as several medium sized high growth economies, may also have given it an advantage over Brazil. Indeed, the status performance of the large Latin American countries provides perhaps the most disheartening evidence from a Brazilian status seeker's perspective (see figure 2 above). Except for Venezuela, *all* the large Latin American states suffer long-term status underperformance. Understood from a regional perspective, Brazil's status performance is actually comparatively good: it beats most of its regional rivals in terms of making the most of its status resources. However, translating this into Brazil's quest for great power status, it seems that Brazil suffers the structural handicap of being from a continent that struggles to make the most of its status resources.

Status Surplus & Normative Status Bounces

Another puzzle illuminated by the data is how Brazil's under-performance persists and even worsens after the move from dictatorship to democracy. If status is partly a function of adherence to international society's norms, Brazil should have begun to improve its performance vis-à-vis the other BRICS. After all, Brazil was either the highest or second highest scoring of the BRICS-countries on standard liberal measures after the end of the military dictatorship in 1985.⁶ In addition, Brazil disclosed and gave up its nuclear weapons program in 1990, fully joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1994, and finally ratified the NPT in 1998, having been a long-term critic (Herz, 2011). The apparent lack of a status gain is perhaps more puzzling when noting that South Africa and Russia's switch to democratic and more liberal norms of governance seemed to prompt significant status bumps: both continue to enjoy significant status overperformance (see figure 2).

⁶ Going by the BRICs Polity IV scores, the Index of Economic Freedom and the Political Terror Scale.

However, looking a little closer, not being a democracy need not imply status underperformance. For instance, China has not suffered status underperformance since the 1990s. Indeed, democratization may be a red herring. While it might be normatively desirable if status dynamics worked like this, in international politics they are far less automatic, more complex, and more infused with arbitrary social power. As Rebecca Adler-Nissen (2014) suggests, rather than treating norms as determinative of stigmatization and the exclusion of a pariah, a less generalizable but more *social* understanding, would recognize that stigma is not automatic, but requires both active stigmatization by an actor and for *the audience* to recognize the stigma and exclude the state.

Unlike South Africa, Brazil had not suffered concerted efforts by members of the international community to stigmatize it. The South African transition from pariah status to symbol of progress, provides an idealized example of why Brazil's democratic transition did not translate into a status bounce. Apartheid South Africa had suffered stigmatization via widespread sanctions and the cutting of diplomatic ties. This made it possible for renewing normal relations to become a huge symbolic event: 130 heads of states gathered to celebrate the inauguration, while 69 diplomatic missions were opened that year (Christopher, 1994). Looking at South Africa overperformance since 1995, it seems that states that may not otherwise have set up embassies did so to symbolize their recognition of the change to a new post-apartheid government. This increase in status performance seems to have translated into very tangible self-reinforcing benefits. South Africa is often mentioned as an emerging power, yet does not possess the size, or material capabilities usually befitting a major power. It is by far the smallest and least influential of the BRICS, but was invited to join amidst arguably more suitable candidates. South Africa's overperformance also illustrates the inadequacy of the language of status inconsistencies, lags or halo effects: South Africa's post-apartheid increase in recognition was almost immediate, was obviously a conscious calculation, and took place absent a significant change in material capabilities. Moreover, its status seeking behavior since appears designed to maintain its status surplus. It is thus misleading to characterize as 'inconsistency' waiting for correction; rather, it appears to be the result of international society deciding that South Africa's transition from apartheid – and the anti-racism it embodied— was and remains worthy of status recognition.

In contrast, international society had scarcely sought to stigmatize Brazil; the pressure to democratize had come largely from below (Hochstetler, 2000). While its status performance was poor, it was several orders better than South Africa's. In short, it was not rewarded with

a post-pariah status bounce because it had not been treated as a pariah. Given that Brazil's status performance did not improve following democratization it suggests that other lurking non-democracy related factors cause its underperformance. Ironically, one tentative conclusion might be that to generate status for doing good deeds, a state must capture the world's attention for its bad deeds first.

Conclusions

This chapter used status performance framework to take a long lens perspective on Brazil's quest for international status: how successful they have been in generating recognition given the resources at their disposal. Our results will disappoint Liberals: Brazil's attempt to seek status as a 'peace power' have yet to bear fruit. We tentatively suggested that part of this underperformance compared to its peers could be attributed to factors beyond Brazil's control: UN Security Council membership and the general handicap that Latin American countries suffer in general. However, the recent upturn in Brazil's status performance following Lula's foreign policy strategy (2003-2011) is consistent with our theorization that status seeking is a skillful practice and Brazil had, and still has, scope for agency to improve its status performance. The findings do not offer conclusive evidence for whether Brazil's strategy of promoting itself as a "peace power" can eventually lead to Brazil fulfilling its status potential. Are the good guys doomed to finish last? It is too early to tell. However, while the norms governing international society might have changed since the Cold War, China demonstrates that following liberal economic and democratic norms are not a pre-requisite to rising to the top echelons of international society's social hierarchy.

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Tables & Figures

Table 1. Status resources (Gross National Income) BRICS countries

| a. GNI absolute values (in milliards constant 2012 USD) | | | | | |
|--|---------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Year | Brazil | USSR/Russia | India | China | South Africa |
| 1970 | 206,4 | 2565,8 | 362,0 | 544,9 | 102,1 |
| 1975 | 455,1 | 2929,1 | 428,0 | 692,2 | 151,2 |
| 1980 | 533,2 | 2622,7 | 517,4 | 846,4 | 215,4 |
| 1985 | 377,9 | 1947,1 | 480,3 | 655,7 | 116,5 |
| 1990 | 716,3 | 997,1 | 567,8 | 688,7 | 189,6 |
| 1995 | 1144,4 | 593,5 | 551,3 | 1081,4 | 223,8 |
| 2000 | 898,8 | 332,9 | 632,2 | 1571,5 | 183,5 |
| 2005 | 1011,0 | 875,9 | 981,3 | 2644,1 | 285,7 |
| 2010 | 2209,6 | 1550,1 | 1771,2 | 6199,9 | 373,8 |

| b. GNI world rank | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Year | Brazil | USSR/Russia | India | China | South Africa |
| 1970 | 16 | 2 | 10 | 8 | 22 |
| 1975 | 13 | 2 | 14 | 9 | 27 |
| 1980 | 12 | 3 | 13 | 8 | 24 |
| 1985 | 13 | 3 | 11 | 9 | 33 |
| 1990 | 10 | 8 | 12 | 11 | 28 |
| 1995 | 7 | 13 | 15 | 8 | 26 |
| 2000 | 9 | 21 | 13 | 7 | 28 |
| 2005 | 10 | 14 | 13 | 5 | 27 |
| 2010 | 7 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 29 |

Table 2. Status recognition and status performance, BRICS countries

| a. Status recognition (World rank on PageRank) | | | | | |
|---|---------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Year | Brazil | USSR/Russia | India | China | South Africa |
| 1970 | 20 | 6 | 9 | 37 | 83 |
| 1975 | 15 | 8 | 10 | 26 | 97 |
| 1980 | 15 | 6 | 8 | 11 | 98 |
| 1985 | 16 | 6 | 9 | 7 | 98 |
| 1990 | 14 | 6 | 12 | 7 | 106 |
| 1995 | 18 | 2 | 12 | 7 | 33 |
| 2000 | 17 | 6 | 12 | 7 | 14 |
| 2005 | 20 | 8 | 12 | 5 | 13 |
| 2010 | 13 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 14 |

| b. Status performance (Standardized score of GNI-PageRank discrepancy) | | | | | |
|---|---------------|--------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Year | Brazil | USSR/Russia | India | China | South Africa |
| 1970 | -0,168 | -0,168 | 0,042 | -1,218 | -2,521 |
| 1975 | -0,089 | -0,268 | 0,179 | -0,760 | -3,085 |
| 1980 | -0,133 | -0,133 | 0,222 | -0,133 | -3,244 |
| 1985 | -0,132 | -0,132 | 0,088 | 0,088 | -2,777 |
| 1990 | -0,178 | 0,089 | 0,000 | 0,178 | -3,346 |
| 1995 | -0,425 | 0,425 | 0,116 | 0,039 | -0,271 |
| 2000 | -0,358 | 0,671 | 0,044 | 0,000 | 0,626 |
| 2005 | -0,464 | 0,279 | 0,046 | 0,000 | 0,650 |
| 2010 | -0,312 | 0,156 | 0,156 | -0,052 | 0,781 |

Figure 2. Status performance based GNI, South America




Figure 2. Status performance based GNI, South America




Figure 1. Status performance based GNI, BRICS




Figure 2. Status performance based GNI, South America

